The Manila Accord 1963 and the Unfinished Question of Self-Determination in North Borneo and Sarawak

The Manila Accord 1963 is one of the most important primary sources for understanding whether the political future of North Borneo and Sarawak had truly been settled by the free and direct will of their peoples before Malaysia was established. It matters because the official treaty record shows that, even at that stage, the wishes of the peoples of the Borneo territories still had to be ascertained by an independent and impartial authority, namely the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative.

This point becomes even more significant when read together with the timing of the Malaysia Agreement. The official UN treaty text records that the Agreement relating to Malaysia was signed in London on 9 July 1963, while the Manila Accord was signed later on 31 July 1963, followed by the Manila Declaration on 3 August and the Joint Statement on 5 August 1963. In other words, the broader Malaysia project had already been formally advanced before the Manila process declared that the wishes of the people of Sabah and Sarawak still had to be independently ascertained.

A central issue therefore arises: if the people’s wishes still had to be independently determined, on what basis was Malaya acting internationally in relation to North Borneo and Sarawak? The Manila instruments were signed by only three states: the Philippines, the Federation of Malaya, and Indonesia. North Borneo and Sarawak did not sign those Manila instruments as equal sovereign parties. In the text, they appear as territories whose wishes still had to be examined, not as peoples already speaking through a fully independent treaty-making capacity of their own.

That does not, by itself, settle every legal question. But it does show something highly important for public understanding: Malaya’s signature was not the same thing as the people’s direct consent. The Manila Accord states that Malaya undertook to consult the British Government and the Government of the Borneo territories in order to invite the UN Secretary-General or his representative to ascertain the wishes of the people. The Joint Statement repeats that Malaya would seek the cooperation of the British Government and the Governments of Sabah and Sarawak to enable the UN task to be carried out. That structure is revealing. If Malaya had already possessed complete and uncontested authority to represent North Borneo and Sarawak, there would have been no need to consult Britain and the territorial governments as separate actors.

The Joint Statement is especially important because it shows that the available political process was not automatically accepted as sufficient proof of self-determination. It required a “fresh approach” within the context of General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV), Principle 9, and directed the UN process to examine whether Malaysia had really been a major issue in the recent elections, whether electoral registers had been properly compiled, whether elections were free and without coercion, whether votes were properly polled and counted, and even the wishes of those who were qualified to vote but could not do so because of detention, imprisonment, or absence. These are not the features of a settled question. They are the features of a question still requiring verification.

The Manila documents also make clear that the issue of North Borneo was not treated as conclusively closed by the proposed formation of Malaysia. The Accord states that the Philippine position on North Borneo remained subject to the final outcome of its claim, and that the inclusion of North Borneo in the Federation of Malaysia would not prejudice either that claim or any right under it. This is another reason the document remains so important: it shows that the regional diplomatic record did not treat the matter as entirely settled merely because a new federation was being planned.

Read carefully, the Manila record does not expressly say that a referendum was legally required. That point should be stated honestly. But the document does show that the wishes of the people had to be independently and credibly determined, and that even recent electoral processes were not accepted without further scrutiny. For that reason, the Manila Accord strongly supports the argument that a direct, unmistakable, and internationally credible act of popular choice would have been the clearest way to settle the political future of North Borneo and Sarawak beyond doubt. That is a reasoned interpretation from the text, not a phrase quoted from it.

This is why the Manila Accord should remain a major public reference. It does not prove that every later legal conclusion automatically follows. But it does prove that, at the heart of the 1963 diplomatic process, the issue of self-determination in Sabah and Sarawak was still live, still important, and still serious enough to require independent UN ascertainment before Malaysia was to be established. That alone is enough to show that the matter was far more complex, contested, and unfinished than simplified official narratives often suggest.

This article is published for historical and public-education purposes. It is based primarily on official treaty and constitutional records relating to the 1963 process. It does not claim that the Manila documents expressly use the word “referendum” or that a single document alone resolves every legal issue. Rather, it argues that the official record shows the wishes of the people of North Borneo and Sarawak still had to be independently ascertained, and that this remains central to any serious evaluation of self-determination in 1963.

United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 550, No. 8029: Manila Accord (31 July 1963), Manila Declaration (3 August 1963), and Joint Statement (5 August 1963).
United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 750, No. 10760: Agreement relating to Malaysia, signed in London on 9 July 1963.
The Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore (State Constitutions) Order in Council 1963 (UK Statutory Instrument 1963 No. 1493).
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV): Principles which should guide Members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73 e of the Charter.